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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided numerous employ-
ment discrimination cases fromJuly 1984 to March 1985.1 This Sur-
vey inspects the court's significant decisions regarding sex, race, and
age discrimination in the workplace. The Survey focuses primarily
on issues relating to liability, including types and burdens of proof,
theories of liability, and the relationship between section 1981 of ti-
tle 42 of the United States Code and title VII. The Survey also ad-
dresses the Eighth Circuit's rulings on procedural issues and
remedies related to employment discrimination.
I. LIABILITY
A. Race and Sex Discrimination
1. Types and Burdens of Proof
In individual employment discrimination suits alleging disparate
treatment 2 brought under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,3
the causation issue is a major hurdle for discrimination litigants. The
United States Supreme Court established the basic allocation of bur-
dens and order of presentation of proof in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green.4 Under the McDonnell Douglas test, a plaintiff has the initial
1. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down employment discrimina-
tion decisions construing one or more of the following federal statutes: the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982) [hereinafter referred to
as title VII], the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982), and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982) [hereinafter
referred to as ADEA].
2. The Supreme Court recognizes two basic types of discrimination under title
VII. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 2 (2d ed. 1983).
Disparate treatment exists when "the employer simply treats some people less favor-
ably than others because of their race, sex, color, religion, or national origin." Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977), quoted in
B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra, at 13. Disparate treatment discrimination is distin-
guishable from disparate impact discrimination. Disparate impact discrimination ex-
ists when employment practices are facially neutral in their treatment of different
groups but in effect discriminate against certain groups in ways which cannot bejusti-
fied by business necessity. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15;
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
The methods of proof necessary to establish each of these claims differs. See
Furuco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 567-80 (1978). See generally United
States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713 n.1 (1983) (noting
the varied treatment of disparate treatment and disparate impact cases).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
4. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination.5 Establishing
a prima facie case creates a presumption of unlawful discrimination.6
If the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by
producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else
was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.7 If the de-
fendant meets this burden, the plaintiff has an opportunity to prove
that the reasons proffered by the defendant were not the actual rea-
sons, but were a pretext for discrimination. 8 In Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine,9 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Mc-
Donnell Douglas tripartite analysis. The Court stated unequivocally
that the plaintiff always retains the burden of proof to persuade the
trier of fact of intentional discrimination.' 0
The Eighth Circuit applied the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine princi-
ples in two noteworthy title VII cases decided during the survey pe-
riod."I In Goodwin v. Circuit Court, 12 the plaintiff, a female attorney,
brought a title VII claim against the circuit court alleging that she
was removed from her position as a hearing officer because of her
sex.' 3 The federal district court issued declaratory judgment in the
plaintiff's favor.14
The Eighth Circuit held that the district court reached this conclu-
sion improperly.' 5 The court of appeals held that the district court
erred in stating that the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
show a nondiscriminatory purpose after the plaintiff establishes her
5. Id. at 802. The plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified
for ajob for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons
of complainant's qualifications.
Id. By establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff creates a presumption that the
employer unlawfully discriminated against him. Id. at 802-03.
6. See id.
7. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981);
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 102-03.
8. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56.
9. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
10. Id. at 256.
11. Bibbs v. Block, 749 F.2d 508 (8th Cir. 1984); Goodwin v. Circuit Court, 729
F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1984). Note that Goodwin was originally decided by the appellate
court on March 6, 1984, but was reviewed again during the survey period after being
remanded. See Goodwin v. Circuit Court, 741 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir. 1984).
12. 729 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1984).
13. Id. at 542. The plaintiff also brought a § 1983 action against the judge of the
circuit court for removing her to another position. Id.
14. Goodwin v. Circuit Court, 555 F. Supp. 658, 663 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
15. Goodwin, 729 F.2d at 543.
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prima facie case.' 6 The Goodwin court, after asserting that the bur-
den of persuasion remains on the plaintiff at all times, noted that the
only burden that shifts to the employer-defendant in title VII actions
is the burden of production.17
Goodwin emphasizes the subtle, yet important, distinction between
the burden of proof and the burden of production. The defendant
does not have to prove a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
action against the employee. The Supreme Court has held that this
burden would be too onerous.18 Goodwin instead affirms that the de-
fendant need only initially produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
explanation for its conduct, not persuade the court of its intent.'o
Bibbs v. Block, 20 a case of first impression, provided the Eighth Cir-
cuit with its second significant title VII controversy. The case in-
volved the appropriate standard of causation to be used at the third
stage of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine analysis when an employer
acts against its employee with a mixed motive.2i The Bibbs court,
relying heavily on Burdine, held that a title VII plaintiff establishes the
defendant's liability for unlawful discrimination "by showing that 'a
discriminatory reason more likely [than not] motivated the
employer.' "22
In Bibbs, the plaintiff, a black male employee, sought a promo-
tion.23 As one of seven applicants, the plaintiff was interviewed by a
committee comprised of three white males. 24 The key person on the
promotion selection committee was found to be racially biased,25
and the committee, as a result, denied the plaintiff a promotion.26
The district court found that the selection committee also lacked
16. Id.
17. Id. at 549.
18. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257; Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25
n.2 (1978).
19. See Goodwin, 729 F.2d at 549; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257-58.
20. 749 F.2d 508 (8th Cir. 1984).
21. Id. at 510. A "mixed-motive" describes a situation where the employer
seems to have been motivated by both lawful and unlawful considerations. Brodin,
The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 292, 293 (1982). At issue is "how large a part the discriminatory
factor must play" before a court holds that the prohibited criterion was the basis for
the decision against the employee. Id.
22. Bibbs, 749 F.2d at 511 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
23. Id. at 509. Bibbs was employed by the Department of Agriculture as an offset
press operator and had applied for a supervisory position in that department. Id.
24. Id. Bibbs was the only black applicant. Id.
25. Id. at 509, 512. The court found that the most influential member of the
selection committee was Joseph Tresnack. Id. at 509. Tresnack was the only commit-
tee member familiar with the print shop and the employees with whom Bibbs would
be dealing. Id.
26. See id. at 509-10.
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credibility because each committee member used different decisional
factors in evaluating the plaintiff.2 7 The plaintiff's expertise and
knowledge were considered along with rumors about his reputation,
some of which were supplied by the committee member whom the
district court found to be racially biased.28 In reviewing the em-
ployer's decision to promote a candidate other than the plaintiff, the
district court found that race was a discernible but not determining
factor, and thus the denial was not improper. 29 The district court
reached this conclusion by applying the same-decision test, a rule
used in cases involving employment decisions based on protected
conduct.30 Under this test, and unlike Burdine, once the plaintiff has
established his or her prima facie case, the burden of persuasion
shifts to the employer.3t The employer must then show by a prepon-
derance of the evidence "that it would have reached the same deci-
sion . even in the absence of the protected conduct."32
The Eighth Circuit, however, rejected this standard for mixed-mo-
tive cases.33 As noted, the district court found race to be a discerni-
ble factor in the employment decision.34 Based on this finding, the
court of appeals concluded that the same-decision test is inappropri-
ate under the principles of Burdine. 35 To the contrary, the court held
that, under Burdine, a "plaintiff need only show that racial reasons
more likely than not influenced the employment decision."3 6 The
Bibbs court reasoned:
We find it inherently inconsistent to say that race was a discerni-
ble factor in the decision, but the same decision would have been
made absent racial considerations. Thus, we think that once race is
shown to be a causative factor in the employment decision, it is
clearly erroneous to find that racial considerations did not affect
the outcome of the decision.3 7
The court stated two additional reasons for rejecting the same-de-
cision test. First, the language of title VII itself recognizes the broad
purpose of eliminating all discrimination in employment.38 Second,
the court noted that the practical effect of the same-decision test un-
27. Id. at 510.
28. Id. at 509. Tresnack referred to Bibbs as a "black militant." Id.
29. Id. at 511.
30. See id.; see also Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 286-87 (1977); Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
31. See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
32. Id.
33. Bibbs, 749 F.2d at 511.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 513.
37. Id. at 512.
38. Id.; see McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800-01; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to -3.
1102 [Vol. I11
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necessarily requires the plaintiff to disprove the defendant's allega-
tions of the defendant's subjective intent.39 The court believed that
such an onerous burden is unreasonable when race has been shown
to be a factor in the employer's decision.40
The Bibbs result is reasonable and necessary. 41 Any attempt to
quantify race as a minor factor is neither practically possible nor de-
sirable. The Supreme Court has previously emphasized, "Discrimi-
natory intent is simply not amenable to calibration."42
Consequently, the Bibbs court properly rejected the same-decision
test unequivocally.43 To hold otherwise in cases where race is found
to be a discernible factor would be to disregard the letter and spirit
of title VII.
In an area where the decisions of the Eighth Circuit and other cir-
cuits have shown little consistency, Bibbs is a useful tool for future
litigants. The "more likely than not" standard is, however, slightly
elusive. While the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of
which standard is appropriate in mixed-motive cases, one scholar be-
lieves that the Supreme Court's previous teachings in title VII cases
point toward the Court's adoption of the same-decision test for
mixed-motive cases. 44 Thus, while Bibbs is useful and reasonable, its
value may be short-lived.
2. Theories of Liability
In Benson v. Little Rock Hilton Inn, 45 the Eighth Circuit lessened the
possibility that employers will be held liable for discrimination on a
retaliation theory. 46 In Benson, the plaintiff, a black woman, worked
as a chambermaid prior to her discharge.47 While cleaning the hotel
general manager's office, the plaintiff found a mock employment ap-
plication which contained racial slurs.48 Shortly thereafter, the plain-
tiff filed a class action suit against the defendant under section 1981
39. Bibbs, 749 F.2d at 512-13.
40. Id. at 513.
41. See Brodin, supra note 21, at 320-22.
42. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 277 (1979).
43. 749 F.2d at 512.
44. See Brodin, supra note 21, at 324-25.
45. 742 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1984).
46. Title VII provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discrim-
inate against any of his employees. . . because he has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
47. Benson, 742 F.2d at 415.
48. Id.
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of title 42 of the United States Code.49 The complaint alleged that
the defendant required black female employees to fill out the appli-
cation and, therefore, maintained policies and practices which ad-
versely affected black female employees.50 After speaking with the
plaintiff concerning the lawsuit, the. hotel manager fired her.51
The plaintiffs initial complaint was dismissed by the district court
for failure to state a claim.52 The plaintiff amended her complaint by
alleging that her discharge was in retaliation for filing her section
1981 claim.53 Her amended complaint invoked both section 1981
and title VII.54 The district court found that the plaintiff lied to her
lawyer regarding the mock application requirement.55 The district
court concluded that the plaintiff was fired because she had falsely
libeled the hotel, lied to the manager, and stolen the document.56
The lower court stated that no racial considerations entered the em-
ployer's decision.57
The court of appeals found that, despite the broad protection tra-
ditionally afforded employees filing discrimination claims against
their employers,58 the plaintiff failed to establish a retaliation
claim.59 Specifically, the court upheld the district court's finding that
the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant retaliated against
her for opposing conduct which the plaintiff reasonably believed
constituted unlawful discrimination.60
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals relied in part on the
standard established in Womack v. Munson,6 1 a strikingly similar case.
In Womack, the court determined that a dismissed employee's post-
complaint statements were similar to the allegations in his title VII
complaint. 62 Consequently, the Womack court found that the em-
ployee's statements were "so inextricably related to the allegation in
the complaint that they [could not] be considered independently of
49. Id. The plaintiff also alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1988 and the
thirteenth amendment. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. The manager approached the plaintiff after having read a newspaper arti-
cle that discussed the lawsuit and the plaintiff's allegation that employees were re-
quired to complete the mock application. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 415-16.
55. Id. at 416.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a):
59. Benson, 742 F.2d at 418.
60. See id.
61. 619 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 979 (1981).
62. See id. at 1297.
1104 [Vol. I11
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one another." 63 On that basis, the court upheld the plaintiff's retali-
ation claim. 64 Womack can be contrasted with Benson, where the
court of appeals found that the discussion the manager had with the
plaintiff the day after she filed her complaint was motivated by events
independent of her complaint.65
Judge Heaney dissented in Benson. He argued forcefully that the
essence of the majority's argument rested on mere technical differ-
ences between filing an action under title VII and section 1981.66 As
noted, the plaintiff initially filed suit pursuant only to section 1981.
Two major problems arose because of that decision. First, section
1981 does not explicitly prohibit an employer from terminating an
employee in retaliation for charging the employer with unlawful dis-
crimination.67 The court has, however, overcome this problem by
treating retaliation claims under section 1981 as though they were
brought under title VII.68 Second, the Benson majority did not give
the plaintiff the same protection she would have had if her complaint
was formally filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC).69 This approach, Judge Heaney concluded, unfairly
penalized the plaintiff for her lawyer's decision to file under section
1981 rather than under title VII.70 Furthermore, the majority's deci-
sion dishonored the federal anti-discrimination law's overall purpose
of protecting employee assertions of discrimination claims against
retaliation. 71
Although the factual findings in Benson might be acceptable, the
majority's legal analysis is disturbing. It is illogical to create a retali-
ation action for section 1981 and fail to give a litigant absolute pro-
tection from retaliatory conduct. The policy of protecting
individuals who file discrimination suits is not served by this deci-
sion. Moreover, the dissent correctly noted that filing a section 1981
lawsuit closely resembles a title VII proceeding, as opposed to a truly
informal opposition which affords slightly less protection from retali-
ation.72 Finally, a section 1981 suit is a nondisruptive remedy estab-
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1299.
65. Benson, 742 F.2d at 417-18.
66. See id. at 419 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 416.
68. See Sisco v.J.S. Alberici Constr. Co., 655 F.2d 146, 150 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982); Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 638 F.2d 1137, 1146-47 (8th
Cir.), modified on other grounds, 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1064 (1981).
69. 742 F.2d at 421 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. Id. Most courts protect informal opposition conduct from retaliation so long
as the employee has a reasonable and good faith belief that the opposed employer
practice is unlawful. Sisco, 655 F.2d at 150. By contrast, courts generally grant em-
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lished by Congress. Given these considerations, Benson indicates that
the court is unwilling to look beyond minor distinctions to protect
complainants alleging retaliatory conduct.
The Eighth Circuit reviewed the denial of another retaliation claim
in Clay v. Consumer Programs, Inc.73 The court of appeals affirmed, per
curiam, the district court on the basis of the lower court's published
opinion. 74
In Clay, the plaintiff, a black male employed by the defendant, ap-
plied as one of several candidates for a management position. 75 The
defendant-employer did not promote the plaintiff.76 The court
found that the plaintiff's attempt to demonstrate a prima facie case of
racial discrimination was unsupported because the plaintiff was un-
qualified for the management position.77 After failing to be pro-
moted, the plaintiff filed a discrimination claim with the EEOC.78
The plaintiff alleged that the employer then retaliated because of the
EEOC filing. 79
The Clay court affirmed that the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burdens
and orders of proof apply to retaliation claims, and set forth the ele-
ments necessary to establish a prima facie case.80 The plaintiff must
show: "(1) statutorily protected participation; (2) adverse employ-
ment action, and (3) a causal connection between the two." 8' The
court found that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the third element.8 2
The plaintiff claimed that certain attendance procedures, deroga-
tory language, and his eventual termination were retaliatory.83 The
defendant established, however, that those procedures were uniform
and offered legitimate reasons for each action.8 4 The plaintiff's fail-
ure to discount the employer's proferred motives resulted in judg-
ment for the defendant.85
Beyond the retaliation theory of liability, the Eighth Circuit ad-
dressed a novel sex discrimination claim in Gilreath v. Butler Manufac-
turing Co. 8 6 In Gilreath, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant
ployees involved in participation conduct absolute protection. See, e.g., Pettway v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1006 (5th Cir. 1969).
73. 745 F.2d 501 (8th Cir. 1984).
74. Id.; see Clay v. Consumer Programs, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
75. Clay, 576 F. Supp. at 186, 187-88.
76. Id. at 188.
77. Id. at 187, 188-89.
78. Id. at 189.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing Womack, 619 F.2d at 1296).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 189-90.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 190.
86. 750 F.2d 701 (8th Cir. 1984).
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to perform numerous labor-relatedjobs.87 He injured his hand, but
was able to return to work wearing a protective dressing.88 One
week later, the plaintiff was assigned to replace a female employee at
a machine because she had difficulty performing her task.89 The
plaintiff refused to report, allegedly because his injury prevented him
from operating the machine.90 The employer dismissed the plaintiff
for insubordinate conduct.91
The plaintiff brought suit alleging that termination of his employ-
ment constituted disparate treatment on the basis of sex because the
female employee was not discharged for her inability to perform the
work.92 The district court dismissed the claim, finding that the plain-
tiff had failed to state a sex discrimination claim.9O
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision.94 The
plaintiff had apparently established a prima facie discrimination
case.9 5 The Gilreath court noted, however, that "[w]hen a claim of
discrimination rests on a particular act such as a discharge, proof of a
discriminatory motive is critical." 96 By failing to show a similarity
between his conduct and that of the female employee who was not
discharged, the plaintiff failed to establish his burden of proof under
the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine test.9 7
3. Procedural Issues
In Briseno v. Central Technical Community College Area,98 the Eighth
Circuit adhered to Johnson v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.,99 holding that
admission of administrative findings in employment discrimination
trials should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.100 In
Briseno, the plaintiff, a Mexican-American, was allegedly denied a
teaching position because of his race.' 0 ' Seeking relief, the plaintiff
87. Id. at 702.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id
93. Id. at 701. The district court found no evidence of disparate treatment based
on the plaintiffs gender. Id.
94. Id. at 703.
95. Id. at 702.
96. Id. (citing International Bht of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15).
97. See id. at 702-03; see alsoJohnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1253-57
(8th Cir. 1981). For a discussion of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine test, see supra
notes 4-10 and accompanying text.
98. 739 F.2d 344 (8th Cir. 1984).
99. 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir. 1984).
100. Briseno, 739 F.2d at 347.
101. Id. at 346.
1985] 1107
9
et al.: Employment Discrimination
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1985
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
exhausted state and federal administrative remedies. 02 He then
filed a race discrimination suit based on title VII and sections 1981
and 1983.103
The trial court excluded from evidence letters and determinations
by state and federal employment opportunity commissions.104
These administrative documents stated that there was "no reason-
able cause to believe the defendants discriminated against the plain-
tiff."105 Although the circuit courts have split on the question of
admitting administrative findings into evidence,t0 6 the Briseno court
found that the district court's denial of admittance did not constitute
an abuse of discretion under the Johnson standard.107 Thus, in
Briseno, the Eighth Circuit chose not to defer to the findings of fed-
eral and state administrative agencies.
In Hickman v. Electronic Keyboarding, Inc., 108 on the other hand, the
Eighth Circuit deferred to state agency and state court findings on a
similar discrimination issue. The appellate court upheld summary
judgment for the defendant-employer stating that the plaintiff-em-
ployee's race discrimination cause of action was properly barred by
res j udicata.10 9 After the employee prevailed at the agency level, the
employer appealed the agency decision to a county court." 0 At the
county court, the employer successfully argued that the employee
had failed to prove his case."'I The employee then sued under title
VII and section 1981 in federal district court.' 12
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 347.
105. Id.
106. Compare Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir.
1981) (not binding, but admissible) and Heard v. Mueller Co., 464 F.2d 190, 194 (6th
Cir. 1972) (within the court's discretion to admit) and Smith v. Universal Servs., Inc.,
454 F.2d 154, 158 (5th Cir. 1972) (not self-serving, therefore admissible) with Walton
v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 75 (3d Cir. 1977) (not admissible) and Cox v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir. 1972) (not reversible error to refuse ad-
mittance).
107. Id. Even assuming that the defendant's proffered evidence should have been
admitted, the lower court's finding of inadmissibility would have been harmless error
in light of the de novo evidence of discrimination presented at trial. Id.
108. 741 F.2d 230 (8th Cir. 1984).
109. The plaintiff was a black man who alleged discrimination concerning his
wages and the denial of a promotion. Id. at 231.
110. Id. at 231-32.
111. Id. at 232.
112. Id. at 231. While granting summary judgment to the employer, the district
court cited Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982) as controlling.
Hickman, 741 F.2d at 232. Kremer states that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 requires federal courts
to give preclusive effect to a state court's review of the state administrative agency's
decision. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466. In essence, Kremer requires that federal courts give
res judicata effect to state court judgments whenever the courts of the state ofjudg-
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The employee in Hickman argued that res judicata did not apply
"because he was not a party nor in privity with a party in the state
administrative and judicial proceedings."13 The court of appeals
disagreed, 14 noting that the agency appeared and actively defended
the plaintiff's interests in state court." 5 The agency also fulfilled its
statutory duty by appearing in state court to eliminate discrimination
in employment.116 The Hickman court concluded that the relation-
ship between the plaintiff and the agency was sufficiently close to sat-
isfy the privity requirement.'1
7
In addition, the court stated an alternative ground for affirming
the judgment. The caption of the case named the plaintiff as a "de-
fendant," and he was served with a copy of the opinion.118 Conse-
quently, the court reasoned that the plaintiff "was a named party in
the full and formal sense" and was bound by the judgment regard-
less of privity.119
The Eighth Circuit, in Sedlacek v. Hach, 120 addressed the jurisdic-
tional prerequisites to a title VII lawsuit. In Sedlacek, the plaintiff had
filed complaints with the EEOC and local and state civil rights com-
missions, but each agency dismissed her complaint without investi-
gating.121 Relying on longstanding precedent 22 holding that
attempted conciliation by the EEOC is neither "a jurisdictional pre-
requisite nor a condition precedent" to judicial review of the Com-
mission's determination of a title VII action, the court reversed the
ment would do so. Hickman, 741 F.2d at 232. In Missouri, resjudicata requires: "(1)
identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the
persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality of the person for or
against whom the claim is made." Prentzler v. Schneider, 411 S.W.2d 135, 138 (Mo.
1966), quoted in Hickman, 741 F.2d at 232.
113. 741 F.2d at 232.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 233.
116. Id.
117. Id. The Hickman court acknowledged the plaintiff's argument that the agency
may not necessarily have been motivated solely by a desire to defend his personal
interests. Id. Nevertheless, the agency did appear in court solely for the purpose of
representing the plaintiff.
118. Id. at 233-34.
119. Id. at 234.
120. 752 F.2d 333 (8th Cir. 1985).
121. Id. at 334. These agencies determined that the defendant corporation em-
ployed fewer than the 15 employees required to give the agencies jurisdiction over
the action. Id.
122. See, e.g., Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 595 F.2d 711, 727
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Hicks v. ABT Assocs., Inc., 572 F.2d 960, 966 (3d Cir. 1978); Wa-
ters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915
(1977); Gamble v. Birmingham S. R.R., 514 F.2d 678, 688 (5th Cir. 1975); Choate v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1968).
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district court's order of dismissal.123 The EEOC's failure to act thus
cannot affect a complainant's substantive rights under title VII.124
Sedlacek also formally approved application of the substantial iden-
tity test to overcome the general rule' 25 that a complainant must file
a charge against a party with the EEOC before she can sue that party
under title VII.126 In Sedlacek, the plaintiff worked for a small subsid-
iary of a parent company.1 27 The plaintiff failed to name the parent
company in the EEOC charge.128 Because the two companies shared
common management and ownership, however, substantial identity
existed between the defendants.129 Thus, the court held that the de-
fendants were a single employer for jurisdictional purposes under
title VII. 130
4. The Relationship Between Section 1981 and Title VII
The Eighth Circuit twice addressed the jury's role when section
1981 and title VII claims are tried jointly. 131 In a joint trial, the sec-
tion 1981 theory is generally tried to a jury and the title VII theory is
tried to the court. 3 2 A litigant normally raises collateral estoppel
pursuant to the jury verdict. If the court upholds the motion, the
litigant is bound by the jury verdict on the factual question of dis-
crimination vel non.t
3 3
Ironically, in both King v. Alco Controls Division of Emerson Electric
Co. 134 and Goodwin v. Circuit Court, 135 estoppel was not raised after
jury verdicts decided the section 1981 issue. In King, the defendant
won the jury verdict and decided the collateral estoppel argument
was unnecessary for the title VII claim.136 This decision ultimately
123. Sedlacek, 752 F.2d at 335. The Supreme Court has held that the only jurisdic-
tional prerequisites to a federal action under title VII are: (1) filing timely charges of
employment discrimination with the EEOC; and (2) receiving and acting upon the
Commission's statutory notice of the right to sue. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 798.
124. Sedlacek, 752 F.2d at 335.
125. See, e.g., EEOC v. McLean Trucking Co., 525 F.2d 1007, 1011 (6th Cir. 1975);
Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Williams v. Gen-
eral Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399, 404 (7th Cir. 1974).
126. Sedlacek, 752 F.2d at 336.
127. Id. at 334.
128. Id. at 335.
129. Id. at 336.
130. Id. While dismissing the defendant's arguments, the court reasoned that ag-
grieved complainants should not be charged with knowledge of the legal intricacies
of closely held corporations. Id.
131. King v. Alco Controls Div. of Emerson Elec. Co., 746 F.2d 1331 (8th Cir.
1984); Goodwin, 729 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1984).
132. See Goodwin, 729 F.2d at 549 n. 11.
133. Id. at 549-50.
134. 746 F.2d 1331 (8th Cir. 1984).
135. 729 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1984).
136. 746 F.2d at 1332 n.2.
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benefited the defendant because the case was upheld on appeal,
based in part on the magistrate's meticulous findings and conclu-
sions of law on the title VII claim.1
3 7
In Goodwin, the court declined to affirm the title VII judgment on a
collateral estoppel basis.' 38 Counsel had assumed that the court
would determine discrimination vel non regardless of the jury ver-
dict on the section 1983 issue.139 The district court had incorrectly
apportioned the burden of proof in Goodwin. 140 Thus, in addition to
neither attorney raising the estoppel by judgment argument, it
would have been unfair to apply estoppel against the defendant be-
cause of the erroneous allocation of proof.141
B. Age Discrimination
1. Types and Burdens of Proof
The Eighth Circuit in EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrolt42
erased any doubt that retirement age and hiring age limits are bona
fide occupational qualifications (BFOQs) for public safety person-
nel.'43 In Missouri State Highway Patrol, the Missouri Legislature es-
tablished a mandatory retirement age of sixty years for all uniformed
members 144 and a maximum hiring age of thirty-two for radio opera-
tors and patrol officers. 145 At trial, each side presented expert medi-
cal witnesses who produced conflicting evidence.146
The district court ruled that Missouri failed to prove that the age
requirements were reasonably necessary under the Usery v. Tamiami
Trail Tours, Inc. test.1 4 7 The appellate court found, however, that the
137. Id
138. 729 F.2d at 549 n.ll.
139. Id
140. Id. at 543; see supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
141. Goodwin, 729 F.2d at 549.
142. 748 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1984).
143. Id. at 450. The ADEA forbids employment restrictions based on age unless
"age is a [BFOQJ reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business .... ." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
144. 748 F.2d at 449 n.3.
145. Id. at 448-50.
146. Id. at 451-55.
147. 531 F.2d 224, 234-36 (5th Cir. 1976).
Applying the Tamiami test to Missouri State Highway Patrol, the Patrol had the bur-
den of establishing:
(1) a correlation between age limitations in question and the safe and effi-
cient performance of the Patrol's functions ... and (2) that it has a factual
basis for believing either that substantially all older uniformed Patrol mem-
bers are unable to perform their duties safely and efficiently, or that some
older Patrol members possess traits which preclude safe and efficient job
performance and which cannot practically be ascertained other than
through knowledge of a Patrol member's age.
Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d at 449.
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district court's emphasis on certain facts and its investigation of the
patrol's subjective motives were incorrect.148 The Eighth Circuit
noted that the Tamiami test focuses on objective evidence in support
of the BFOQ. 149 This objective analysis was particularly pertinent
given the abundant medical evidence involved.
The court of appeals, in a tersely worded decision, held that the
district court's factual findings were erroneous. 5 0 The court based
this conclusion on Missouri's expert witness and other evidence
which showed: (1) that substantially all members over sixty years
lack sufficient aerobic capacity to perform their physically and emo-
tionally strenuous duties safely and efficiently; (2) that testing would
be an ineffective alternative to age as a means of distinguishing
among individuals over sixty years; and (3) that a maximum hiring
age ensures that the highway patrol can take advantage of the physi-
cal skills and abilities of younger persons.' 5 '
In approving the age requirements, the court of appeals noted that
Congress has established age requirements for federal law enforce-
ment personnel.152 In addition, the First and Fourth Circuits have
found similar state age requirements to be BFOQs.153 In essence,
the unequivocal language in Missouri State Highway Patrol demon-
strates that the Eighth Circuit is receptive to age BFOQs in public
safety occupations.
In a second age discrimination case, the Eighth Circuit reviewed
the burden of proof required to establish a prima facie case. In
Crimm v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 154 the plaintiff-employee con-
tested the district court's requirement that he prove compliance with
the defendant's employment rules and regulations as part of his
prima facie case, claiming inconsistency with the McDonnell Doug-
las/Burdine principles.155 The court of appeals agreed, and held that
a plaintiff "need not anticipate and refute the employer's legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons in order to establish a prima facie
148. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d at 454.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 453-55. For example, the court stated, "Although the District Court
discounted the Patrol's expert evidence as 'not persuasive' and 'often contradictory,'
. . .we find this conclusion wholly unsupported by the record." Id. at 453.
151. Id. at 455.
152. Id. at 455-56. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 8335(b), 8336(c).
153. Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1984) (mandatory retirement age
of 50 for state police upheld); Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 731 F.2d 209 (4th Cir.
1984) (mandatory retirement age of 55 for firefighters upheld).
154. 750 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1984).
155. Id. at 711. McDonnell Douglas requires that the plaintiff demonstrate minority
status, that he applied for and was qualified for the posted position, that he was re-
jected for the position, and that despite his rejection, the position remained open.
411 U.S. at 802.
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case."' 5 6 That holding reflects the significant precept that while the
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine principles apply in age discrimination
cases, they are not rigid or mechanical.157 Rather, the scheme is but
one way of establishing a case of employment discrimination.158
In Crimm, the plaintiff, a sixty-year-old male, claimed that he was
forced to resign because of his age.' 5 9 The defendant-employer al-
leged that the employee was terminated because he sexually har-
rassed a subordinate.160 The court held that in discharge cases,
unlike hiring cases, the issue of whether the plaintiff was satisfactorily
performing his job permeates his prima facie case.' 6 1 Thus, in order
to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff need only prove that "he
[or she] was doing his [or her] job well enough to rule out the pos-
sibilities that he [or she] was fired for inadequate job
performance." 162
Surprisingly, the Crimm court wavered from its previous position
on similar types of errors, 163 and found the error harmless.164 The
court found that the evidence demonstrating that the employee was
discharged for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was strong,
thereby undermining any inference of discrimination.165
The court raised, but declined to answer, a separate question of
whether an employer's good cause for discharge in a case brought
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 166 may be
based on good faith alone.167 Thus, the open question signals the
court's struggle to establish concrete rules in this area of discrimina-
tion jurisprudence.
2. Procedural Issues
In Kriegesmann v. Bariy-Wehmiller Co., 168 the Eighth Circuit rejected
an employee's argument that the late filing of his age discrimination
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 706.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 711. This issue formulation was adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Hal-
sell v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285, 290 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1205 (1983). It was initially implemented by the First Circuit. Loeb v. Textron, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1003, 1013-14 (1st Cir. 1979).
162. Crimm, 750 F.2d at 711 (quoting Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1013).
163. See Goodwin, 729 F.2d 541.
164. Crimm, 750 F.2d at 712.
165. Id.
166. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
167. Climm, 750 F.2d at 713.
168. 739 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1984).
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charge with the EEOC did not prejudice the employer.1 6 9 In Krieges-
mann, the appellant-employee claimed that the employer construc-
tively misrepresented facts to him.170 The appellant argued that by
extending his severance benefits over a twenty-five week period and
offering to assist him in finding a new job, "the employer lulled him
into sleeping on his rights."' 17 1 The court rejected this argument
and stated that as a matter of law:
the attempt to mitigate the harshness of a decision terminating an
employee, without more, cannot give rise to an equitable estoppel.
The statute of limitations will not be tolled on the basis of equita-
ble estoppel unless the employee's failure to file in timely fashion is
the consequence either of a deliberate design by the employer or of
actions that the employer should unmistakably have understood
would cause the employee to delay filing his charge.'
7 2
The court reaffirmed prior case law which held "ADEA's 180-day
filing requirement is in the nature of a statute of limitations and sub-
ject to equitable tolling.""73 The equitable tolling doctrine, how-
ever, is applied only in instances where positive misconduct is
perpetrated by the party against whom the doctrine is asserted. As
noted, no positive misconduct by the employer was present here.
Another significant decision by the Eighth Circuit foreclosed the
district court and plaintiff's counsel from notifying putative class
members of an ADEA class action suit. In McKenna v. Champion Inter-
national Corp., 174 the plaintiff, a former executive, brought suit alleg-
ing that he was discharged because of his age. The district court
granted the plaintiff's motion to file a class action,t75 directed the
employer to furnish the names of all persons within the class, and
169. Id. at 359. Section 626(d) of title 29 of the United States Code provides in
pertinent part:
No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this section until
60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Such a charge shall be
filed-
(1) within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred ....
29 U.S.C. § 626(d).
The employee in Kriegesmann filed with the EEOC 272 days after his alleged dis-
criminatory termination. 739 F.2d at 358.
170. 739 F.2d at 358.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 358-59 (quoting Price v. Litton Business Sys., Inc., 694 F.2d 963, 965
(4th Cir. 1982)).
173. Id. at 359.
174. 747 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1984).
175. Id. at 1212. ADEA specifically incorporates § 16 of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 216, for enforcement purposes. Section 216(b) provides in
pertinent part:
An action . may be maintained against any employer ... by any one or
more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other em-
ployees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such
[Vol. I111114
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ordered that all prospective members be notified. 176
The court of appeals' initial analysis of the notice issue compared
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and section 216(b) of
title 29 of the United States Code. 177 The court recognized the fun-
damental difference that exists between the two procedures.i78 Rule
23 authorizes a district court in a class action to "direct notice to the
members who can be identified through reasonable effort." 179 Thus,
in a rule 23 class action, each person within the description is consid-
ered to be a class member, bound by judgment, unless the person
"opts out."t 8 0 Under section 216(b), to the contrary, no person can
become a plaintiff or be bound by judgment unless the person af-
firmatively "opts into" the class by filing written consent.' 8 ' In this
light, section 216(b) tends to discourage collective litigation because
it requires "an affirmative act by each plaintiff."182
Other circuit courts are split as to whether district courts have the
power to authorize notice to prospective class members.183 Accord-
ing to the McKenna court, the Second Circuit, which held that district
courts have the power to authorize notice, addressed the issue in a
conclusory fashion and relied on a liberal construction of the Fair
Labor Standards Actl84 and its desire to avoid a multiplicity of
action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and
such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.
Id
176. 747 F.2d at 1212. The notice was directed to all employees who were over
40 years old either currently or as of 1977. Id.
177. Id. at 1213.
178. Id.
179. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
180. McKenna, 747 F.2d at 1213 (citing Schmidt v. Fuller Brush Co., 527 F.2d 532,
536 (8th Cir. 1975)).
181. Id.
182. Id (citing Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir.
1984)).
183. The Second Circuit holds that district courts have the power to authorize
notice. Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d
Cir. 1978). The Ninth Circuit has ruled that the district courts have no authority
under § 216(b) to direct or permit potential claimants to be notified of the pending
suit. Partlow v. Jewish Orphans' Home, 645 F.2d 757, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1981); Kin-
ney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1977). The Seventh Circuit
has also determined that district courts lack authority to send out notice containing
indicia that might be misinterpreted as judicial endorsement of the claim, such as
court letterhead or official signatures. Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d
578, 581 (7th Cir. 1982). The Tenth Circuit also holds that district courts lack the
authority to send or direct notice. Dolan, 725 F.2d at 1268. The Tenth and Seventh
Circuits grant plaintiffs counsel, however, a right of reasonable communication with
potential class members. McKenna, 747 F.2d at 1213 n.l.
184. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982)).
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suits.185 The McKenna court found that the Seventh, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits had carefully considered the issue and that their rea-
soning was therefore persuasive.186 Consequently, the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that the power to give notice "is neither legislatively
granted nor constitutionally required."18 7
The McKenna court prohibited plaintiffs counsel from sending no-
tice to potential ADEA class members.18 8 Analyzing notice as com-
mercial speech, the court found that the judiciary has a substantial
interest in regulating the practice of attorneys.' 89 Further, the court
found that the notice fell within the prohibition of DR 2-103(A) of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a "lawyer
shall not . . . recommend employment . . . of himself . . . to a
layperson who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a
lawyer."190 The concern over conflicts of interest, as reflected in DR
2-103(A), becomes even more important in a class action situation
because of the large number of actual and potential clients.19 1
In his concurring opinion, Judge McMillian noted an important
distinction which provides some practical guidance for future liti-
gants attempting to overcome the notice issue. His concurrence
points out that the court's holding "is specifically directed to plain-
tiff's counsel. "192 Judge McMillian stated that the majority opinion
does not "prohibit theplaintiffin a § 216(b) action from communicat-
ing with other potential members of the class."193 Judge McMillian
would also permit district courts to direct the defendant to provide
the plaintiff with the necessary names and addresses for notice
purposes.1
94
II. REMEDIES
A. Reinstatement and Back Pay
In Briseno v. Central Technical Community College Area, 195 the plaintiff
proved that he was denied a full-time teaching position in 1979 be-
cause of his national origin.196 The district court awarded the plain-
185. 747 F.2d at 1213-14.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1214.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1215.
190. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A) (1980).
191. McKenna, 747 F.2d at 1215.
192. Id. at 1217 (McMillian, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (empha-
sis in original).
193. Id. (emphasis in original).
194. Id.
195. 739 F.2d 344 (8th Cir. 1984).
196. Id. at 346.
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tiff over $52,000 in back pay, reinstatement for at least four years by
the college at a salary no less than the person who received the posi-
tion, and placement in a full-time teaching position.'97
On appeal, the court found the award uniquely too broad and too
narrow.198 The award was too broad in the court's view because it
appeared to give the plaintiff "immediate status as a permanent em-
ployee rather than a probationary one."1 99 The award was too nar-
row in that it appeared to limit the "plaintiffs right to employment
or 'front pay' to a period of four years."20 0 In essence, the court
reasoned that the plaintiff is entitled simply to a position comparable
to the one denied him.201
B. Wages During Litigation
The Eighth Circuit refused to accept the plaintiffs argument in
Burrows v. Chemed Corp. 202 that her employer retaliated against her by
failing to grant her leave of absence with pay during title VII litiga-
tion. The plaintiff in Burrows also claimed that the defendant's failure
to pay the plaintiff's witnesses, her co-employees, for lost wages
while in court was a penalty against her.2 0 3 The court similarly re-
jected this claim.
The plaintiff relied on Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co.,204 but the Bur-
rows court distinguished this case. The litigants in Kyriazi were in-
volved in a class action suit that had reached a stage-two proceeding
for a class action suit to determine individual damage awards.2 05
The plaintiff in Burrows was simply not in such a posture. She was
only in a stage-one proceeding for determining initial liability.206
The court held that litigants who are unsuccessful in establishing lia-
bility are not entitled to such expenses. 207
C. Punitive Damages
In Goodwin v. Circuit Court, 208 the Eighth Circuit upheld an award of
punitive damages in a section 1983 sex discrimination action even
197. Id.
198. Id. at 348.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. In the event that no teaching position was available for the plaintiff imme-
diately, the court awarded the plaintiff the difference between what he would have
earned in his teaching position and what he earned in mitigation of damages. Id.
202. 743 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1984).
203. Id. at 617.
204. 469 F. Supp. 672 (D.N.J. 1979).
205. Id. at 673.
206. Burrows, 743 F.2d at 618.
207. Id.
208. 729 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1984).
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though only nominal damages were shown at trial.2o9 The court re-
stated its punitive damages standard: "Punitive damages may . . .
be awarded in civil rights actions where the defendant exhibits op-
pression, malice, gross negligence, willful or wanton misconduct, or
a reckless disregard for the civil rights of the plaintiff." 210 The Good-
win court noted specifically that such conduct may be sanctioned by a
punitive award under section 1983.211 In addition, the court stated
emphatically that actual damages need not be proven for an award of
punitive damages, and that punitive damages may be awarded in ad-
dition to nominal damages.2 12 By affirming the availability of puni-
tive damages, the court ensured that an employee will be adequately
compensated if he or she is able to establish the employer's liability.
209. Id. at 542-43.
210. Id. at 547 (quoting Guzman v. Western State Bank, 540 F.2d 948, 953 (8th
Cir. 1976)).
211. Goodwin, 729 F.2d at 547.
212. Id at 548.
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